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I. INTRODUCTION

Applicants seeking benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act' and coal
companies asked to pay these compensation claims continue to litigate the claims
under a fog of uncertainty. In recent years, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court have issued complex decisions in determining
whether disability due to coal workers' pneumoconiosis has been proven. Differing
interpretations of necessary elements of entitlement, as fundamental as the
definition of the disease itself, have made the claims take on different meanings
depending in which federal appellate circuit the miner worked. Partially in response
to these differences and partially in an attempt to have its interpretation adopted by
circuits where it has been previously rejected, the Department of Labor has
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proposed to change the regulations controlling the adjudication of Federal Black
Lung Claims.
This Article does not attempt to address the majority of the proposed
changes in the regulations. Rather, it summarizes the recent changes or
clarifications in the interpretations of the Black Lung Benefits Act and its
implementing regulations since 1995. Where appropriate, this Article discusses
those situations where the proposed changes intersect the recent decisions. Because
the majority ofthe claims that the author handles are controlled by the rulings of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the recent black lung
decisions of the Fourth Circuit are emphasized in this synopsis of recent decisions.
I1. WHAT IS COAL WORKERS' PNEUMOCONIOSIS?
A.

Obstructive Impairments

Only twenty-five years after the passage of the implementing regulations,
the definition of the disease for which compensation is provided under the Black
Lung Benefits Act (BLBA)2 is still not as clear as the Congressional definition of
the disease might seem to indicate after a causal reading. Congress defined
"pneumoconiosis" as a "chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae, including
respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment."3
From this straight-forward definition of the pneumoconiosis, the
"permanent" 4 regulations add a descriptive definition of pneumoconiosis by
providing an illustrative listing of diseases that are included in the definition of
pneumoconiosis.5 From these seemingly clear definitions, distinctions arose

2

30 U.S.C. § 901-62 (1994).
30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1994).

20 C.F.R. Part 718 (1997) applies to claims filed after March 31, 1981. The definition of
pneumoconiosis is substantially the same for claims evaluated under 20 C.F.R. Part 727 and Part 410.
See 20 C.F.R. § 727.202; 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(o) (1997).
4

Section 718.201 provides:
For the purpose of the Act, pneumoconiosis means a chronic dust disease of the
lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising
out of coal mine employment This definition includes, but is not limited to, coal
workers' pneumoconiosis, anthracosilicosis, anthracosis, anthrosilicosis, massive
pulmonary fibrosis, progressive massive fibrosis, silicosis or silicotuberculosis,
arising out of coal mine employment.
20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (1997).
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between "legal" and "medical" pneumoconiosis.6 Clinical pneumoconiosis, or what
is also referred to as "medical" pneumoconiosis, is a lung disease caused by fibrotic
reaction of the lung tissue to inhaled dust, which is generally visible on chest x-ray
films as opacities.7 Legal pneumoconiosis refers to all lung diseases which meet the
statutory or regulatory definition of any lung disease that is significantly related to,
or substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment! Legal
pneumoconiosis can include diseases beyond what is usually described as medical
pneumoconiosis.
From this long-standing understanding of the meaning of pneumoconiosis,
a split in the circuits has arisen whether "obstructive lung diseases" are or are not
encapsulated in the statutory definition of pneumoconiosis? In a brief three page
decision issued in 1995, a panel of the Fourth Circuit forever reshaped the
definition of pneumoconiosis in black lung claims.' The benefits claimant, David
Warth, appealed from an Administrative Law Judge's ("ALP) adverse
determination that pneumoconiosis was not established based on the assessments
made by two physicians who opined that coal workers' pneumoconiosis did not
include obstructive lung diseases. The court concluded,
We agree with Warth that these assumptions are erroneous.
Chronic obstructive lung disease thus is encompassed within the
definition of pneumoconiosis for purposes of entitlement to Black
Lung benefits, Dr. Mutchler's assumption to the contrary
undermines his conclusions, because it is undisputed that Warth
does not suffer from some form of obstructive lung disease, and
Drs. Mutchler and Donnerberg failed to give legitimate reasons for
ruling out dust exposure in coal-mine employment as a cause or
aggravation of that disease."
6

The difference between legal and clinical pneumoconiosis is not new. See Nance v. Benefits

Review Bd., 861 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 1988).
7

See Usery v. Turner-Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976).

8

See Hobbs v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 917 F.2d 790, 791 (4th Cir. 1990).

After an Administrative Law Judge's decision on the merits of the claim is made, the parties
have a right to review before the Benefits Review Board ("BRB"). After the BRB renders its final
decision in a matter, appeals as of right may be taken to the circuit court of appeals having jurisdiction
over the state where the injury is alleged to have occurred. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.481-.482 (1997).
9

10

See Warth v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 60 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 1995).

it

Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
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To reach this conclusion, the court provided three reasons. Two references
are contained in the body of the decision: the statutory definition of pneumoconiosis
and a prior Fourth Circuit decision, Eagle v. Armco, Inc. 2 A third reason appears
in a footnote. Neither the statutory definition 3 nor the expanded regulatory
definition 4 includes or excludes "obstructive lung diseases" as pneumoconiosis.
Both the statutory and regulatory definitions provide any chronic dust disease of the
lungs may meet the definition of pneumoconiosis when the chronic dust-induced
lung disease arose out of coal mine work.
The other authority cited for the proposition that obstructive lung diseases
are encompassed within the definition of pneumoconiosis is a footnote in a prior
Fourth Circuit decision. This footnote is dicta as the court addresses an issue
clearly not needed for the determination of the case. 5 The footnote in Eagle
provides:
In deposition testimony, Dr. Daniel asserted his view that breathing
coal mine dust does not cause chronic obstructive lung disease. He
stated that inhalation of coal dust "is not a cause per se of Chronic
Obstructive Lung Disease, it can aggravate Chronic Obstructive
Lung Disease," and insisted that "[n]on-smokers without evidence
of asthma or infectious processes show now evidence of
obstruction from coal mine employment ..... For the purposes of
consideration in black lung cases, this opinion must be considered
bizarre in view of a Congress' explicit finding to the contrary. 6
Nowhere in either title thirty § 90 1(a) or § 902(b) of the United States Code is there
an explicit Congressional finding concerning obstructive lung diseases.
The third reason, provided in a footnote, explained that Doctor Donnerberg
"concluded a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis cannot be made without evidence by x-

12

943 F.2d 509, 511 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991).

13

30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1994).

14

20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (1997).

In Eagle, the court addressed the understanding needed by an examining physician
concerning the exertional rigors of a miner's last coal mine employment to assess pulmonary capacity
15

for disability.
16

Eagle, 943 F.2d at 513 n.2 (citations omitted).
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ray of a nodular or linear infiltrate, an autopsy or a tissue examination." 7 This
conclusion was found to conflict with the intent of the regulations defining
pneumoconiosis. Title twenty § 718.202(a)(4) of the Code of Federal Regulations
states that a determination of pneumoconiosis may be made notwithstanding a
negative chest x-ray based on objective medical studies such as blood-gas studies,
electrocardiograms, pulmonary function studies, physical performance tests,
physical examination, and medical work histories. The court concluded Dr.
Donnerberg's opinion is based on a premise in direct conflict with the regulations
promulgated to apply the BLBA.
The authorities provided by the Warth court fail to support the logical
conclusion that chronic lung disease must be encompassed in the definition of
pneumoconiosis. It is only when a physician determines that chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease ("COPD") arose, at least in part, out of coal mine employment
that COPD falls within the definition of pneumoconiosis. There exists no
Congressional mandate that all, or any, obstructive disorders can be caused by coal
mine dust. The logical conclusion is chronic obstructive lung diseases can, but need
not, be included in the definition of pneumoconiosis.
Some representing benefits claimants"8 and the Department of Labor 9 seek
to have all chronic obstructive lung diseases included in the definition of
pneumoconiosis and, in so doing, diminish the required causation element linking
pulmonary disease to coal mine work. This interpretation stems from the court's
reasoning in Warth that reversed the ALJ's denial of benefits because the physicians
relied upon failed to give legitimate reasons for ruling out dust exposure in coal
mine employment as a cause or aggravation of that disease. 0 First, such an analysis
needlessly utilizes the term "rule out," which has a significant technical meaning
under the old regulations.2 Second, it errantly alters the burden of proof because

17

Warth, 60 F.3d at 175 n.1.

is

See Timothy F. Cogan, Is the Doctor Hostile? Obstructive Impairmentsand the Hostility

Rule in FederalBlack Lung Claims,97 W. VA. L. REV. 1003 (1995).

19

See the suggested revisions to definition of pneumoconiosis in 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (Jan. 22

1997).
20

Warth, 60 F.3d at 175.

21

See Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that

under § 727.203(b)(3), a party opposing entitlement had to "rule out" impairment due to
pneumoconiosis).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:601

the benefits claimant, and not the employer, shoulders the burden to prove the
existence of pneumoconiosis.22
The controversy is important because obstructive lung diseases are
frequently found in coal miners, and cigarette smoking has been diagnosed as, or
at least a part of, the cause of the obstructive lung disease?, It is repeatedly argued
on behalf of benefits claimants that based on the strength of the language in Warth,
if a physician has concluded an obstructive disorder was not coal workers'
pneumoconiosis, the ALJ must discredit the opinion as "hostile to the Act."24
"Hostile to the Act" is at best a nebulous concept. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed an AL's decision to give negligible weight to a physician's opinion
because the physician would not diagnose pneumoconiosis absent positive x-ray
evidence that the disease existed.' As the BLBA provides a presumption of
pneumoconiosis even when it cannot be proven by x-ray, 6 the court reasoned that
the physician's opinion could be discounted as inconsistent with the BLBA.27 A
whole series of cases related to the "hostile-to-the-Act" concept have since been
handed down.2" Lost from this series of cases is the reality noted long ago by the
Supreme Court when it stated that "[s]imple pneumoconiosis, ordinarily identified
by x-ray opacities of a limited extent, is generally regarded by physicians as seldom
productive of significant ventilatory impairment."29 As the Benefits Review Board
explained in 1982, "hostile to the Act" does not include physicians who refuse to
assess disability based on x-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis. It is only when a

2

See Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994).

Obstructive lung diseases diminish the ability to expel air from the lungs, while restrictive
lung diseases diminish the ability to get air into the lungs.
23

24

See Cogan, supra note 18.

25

See Black Diamond Coal Mining Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 758 F.2d 1532, 1534 (1 th

Cir. 1985).

See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3)-(4) (1994) (creating a presumption of total disability due to
pneumoconiosis based on 15 years of coal mine employment and evidence of a pulmonary disability).

26

27

Black Diamond,758 F.2d at 1534.

See, e.g., Blakley v. Amax Coal Co., 54 F.3d 1313 (7th Cir. 1995); Penn Allegheny Coal Co.
v. Mercatell, 878 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1989); Searls v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rep.
(MB) 1-161 (B.R.B. 1988); Wetherill v. Green Construction Co., 5 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-248, 128

252 (B.R.B. 1982).
29

Usery v. Turner-Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976).
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physician rejects simple pneumoconiosis as a possible source of disability in coal
miners generally, that the physician's opinion conflicts with the spirit of the
BLBA.3 0
The concept of "hostile to the Act" has recently forced the Fourth Circuit
to split hairs. In 1995, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held a physician's opinion was
"hostile to the Act" where the doctor stated that simple pneumoconiosis does not
cause total disability "as a rule."' Yet, in a 1997 decision, the Fourth Circuit held
a physician's opinion was properly determined not to be "hostile to the Act" where
the physician concluded that simple pneumoconiosis would "not be expected" to
cause pulmonary impairment?' Apparently, when a physician invokes the magic
talisman "not to be expected" as opposed to "as a rule" the opinion is not "hostile
to the Act."
In Stiltner v. Island Creek Coal Co.," the Fourth Circuit revisited the
definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and addressed the tension created by
the suggestion that under Warth an ALJ must automatically discard the opinion of
any physician who opined COPD is due to something other than coal dust. In
Stiltner, the benefits claimant generally contended that most of Island Creek's
experts improperly theorized that "coal dust exposure does not give rise to an
' While the court acknowledged that the Fourth Circuit
obstructive impairment."34
had previously rejected as inimical to the BLBA the premise that "obstructive
disorders cannot be caused by coal-mine employment," the medical opinions
challenged here made no such claim?5 The panel explained,
In Warth, we held that chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD) falls within the regulatory definition of
pneumoconiosis if the COPD is significantly related to or
aggravated by coal mine employment. We therefore cautioned
ALJs not to rely on medical opinions that rule out coal mine
employment as a causal factor based on the erroneous assumption
that pneumoconiosis causes a purely restrictive form of

30

See Wetherill, 5 Black Lung Rep. at 1-252.

31

See Thorn v. Itmann Coal Co., 3 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1995).

32

See Lane v. Union Carbide Corp., 105 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1997).

33

86 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1996).

34

Id. at 341 (citing appellant's brief).

35

Id.
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impairment, thereby eliminating the possibility that coal dust
exposure also can cause COPD.
Unlike the medical opinions we examined in Warth, none
of the challenged physicians here assumed that coal mine
employment can never cause COPD; they merely opined that
Stiltner likely would have exhibited a restrictive impairment in
addition to COPD, if coal dust exposure were a factor.36
The rule of law in the Fourth Circuit seems to be if a physician assumes coal mine
work never causes obstructive impairments, then that opinion should be viewed as
inimical to the BLBA.
The revised rule of law, as stated in Stiltner, is that if a physician assumes
coal mine work never causes obstructive impairments, that opinion should be
viewed as inimical to the BLBA. Stiltner corrects the misperception that Warth
meant COPD automatically falls into the legal definition of pneumoconiosis. The
Stiltner court, bound by the errant precedent in Warth, provides no basis in the
BLBA37 or the regulations 8 to assert a physician that assumes coal mine work never
causes COPD is inimical to the BLBA.
Other circuits have taken a different approach and relied on the language
in the BLBA or the implementing regulations to acknowledge that pneumoconiosis
is defined broadly and the BLBA does not establish that dust exposure from coal
mine work can necessarily cause obstructive pulmonary diseases or impairment. 9
Instead of setting an iron-clad rule applicable to every case, the Seventh Circuit has
determined that "the facts and medical opinions in each specific case answer this
question."4' This approach defers to the assessments made by physicians as to the
cause of pulmonary disease.
The import of the definition of coal workers' pneumoconiosis has taken on
special meaning for another reason. On January 22, 1997, the Department of Labor
published proposed changes to the regulations implementing the Federal Coal Mine

36

Id. (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).

37

30 U.S.C. § 901-62 (1994).

38

20 C.F.R. Part 718 (1997).

See, e.g., Blakley v. Amax Coal Co., 54 F.3d 1313, 1321 (7th Cir. 1995); Freeman United
Coal Mining Co. v. OWCP, 957 F.2d 302, 303 (7th Cir. 1992).
39

40

Id
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Health and Safety Act of 1969."' These regulatory changes, which are still under
consideration as of the time of this Article, attempt to expand the definition of
The proposed change
pneumoconiosis beyond the statutory definition 2
specifically adds a "legal definition" of pneumoconiosis to include,
any chronic lung disease or impairment and its sequelae arising out
of coal mine employment. This definition includes, but is not
limited to, any restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising
out of coal mine employment. 3
By administrative fiat, the Secretary Department of Labor suggests a new
definition of pneumoconiosis so as to encompass more chronic lung conditions than
otherwise suggested by the various federal appellate courts or the Benefits Review
Board. The goal of the change is candidly admitted to "foreclose litigation"
attempting to narrow the definition of pneumoconiosis." This proposed change in
the regulations would have the effect of expanding the definition of pneumoconiosis
to presumptively include all chronic lung diseases as long as some physician asserts
the lung disease arose out of coal mine work. Such an expansion of the definition
of pneumoconiosis would effectively resurrect the presumption effective for claims
filed before the first of April, 1980, that any chronic lung disease is due to coalmine employment!'5
The frustration surrounding the definition of pneumoconiosis experienced
by the circuit courts, the Department of Labor, and the other parties has been, in
part, directly attributable to the parties that litigate these claims. It has been
legitimately observed that
[m]uch confusion . . . stems from the failure of counsel and
witnesses to specify, when they use the term "pneumoconiosis,"
whether they are referring to legal or clinical pneumoconiosis, and
41

See 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (Jan. 22, 1997). The proposed changes are so sweeping that most of

these changes are beyond the scope of this Article.
42

The propriety ofthe change has been challenged not only on its medical grounds but on legal

grounds, as the Secretary of Labor has suggested altering the Congressional definition of
pneumoconiosis nearly 30 years after it was defined at 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1994).
43

62 Fed. Reg. at 3376.

44

Id. at 3343.

45

See 20 C.F.R. Part 727.203(a)(1)-(5) (1997).
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from the failure of the ALJ to resolve the conflict when this
ambiguity arises in the record. To make an accurate assessment of
whether the AL's decision is supported by substantial evidence,
the litigants and the ALJ alike must cooperate to provide a record
free from this ambiguity. As we have observed, clinical
pneumoconiosis is only a small subset of the compensable
afflictions that4 6fall within the definition of legal pneumoconiosis
under the Act.
The Fourth Circuit again addressed the conflict in an unpublished decision
by observing,
Experience has shown that Congress chose poorly when it picked
the word "pneumoconiosis" to denote the broad class of pulmonary
afflictions for which it intended to provide benefits.
"Pneumoeconiosis" is a word that was already taken, and, moreover,
taken by the very expert witnesses - physicians and radiologists on which the claims resolution process relies. In insisting upon the
presence of coal macules for a diagnosis of "pneumoconiosis,"
[Doctors] used the term in the sense natural to them as clinicians.
Unfortunately, use of only the clinical sense of the word
leaves much unaddressed, because Congress defined
"pneumoconiosis" as a broad set of diseases, bound together not by
a common pathology but rather by a common cause: exposure to
coal dust.47
Parties must not only inquire as to the existence of pneumoconiosis, but
also inquire as to whether a benefits claimant has any chronic dust disease arising
out of coal mine employment as the BLBA and regulations define pneumoconiosis.
An ALJ may not consider the opinion of a physician who refuses to find a causal
connection between a claimant's coal mine employment and respiratory disability
solely because disability is obstructive in nature4 However, an ALJ need not
discredit the opinion of a physician who notes the absence of a restrictive
impairment if the opinion does not rest on the assumption that coal-mine

46

Richardson v. Director, OWCP, 94 F.3d 164, 169 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

47

Brooks v. W.P. Coal Co., I10 F.3d 59, availablein 1997 WL 158116, at *2-3 (4th Cir.

1997) (unpublished disposition).
48

See Warth v. Southern Ohio Coal Co., 60 F.3d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1995).
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employment never causes obstructive impairment. 9 The lesson for those that either
seek entitlement to Black Lung Benefits or defend these claims is to resolve any
potential confusion over the term "pneumoconiosis" and to include both the
"medical" and "legal" definition of pneumoconiosis in the presentation of their
case.

B.

A Progressiveand Latent Disease

The obstructive/restrictive question has not been the only source of
controversy in the definition of pneumoconiosis. Pneumoconiosis is defined by
Congress as a "chronic lung disease."5' In its first decision addressing the BLBA,
the Supreme Court added to the definition by stating that pneumoconiosis is also an
'
The Third Circuit altered this description
"irreversible and progressive disorder."51
52
in a 1995 decision, and held that pneumoconiosis is a latent dust disease.
To reach the conclusion that pneumoconiosis is a latent disease, the panel
relied not on the administrative record developed before the ALJ, but on The
5 3 The Merck Manual of
Sloane-DorlandAnnotated Medical-Legal Dictionary,
Diagnosisand Therapy,' and a single medical study of French coal miners!' The
full description of coal workers' pneumoconiosis in The Merck Manualprovides a
different picture:

49

See Stiltner v. Island Creek Coal, Co., 86 F.3d 337, 341 (4th Cir. 1996).

50

30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1994).

Usery v. Tumer-Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976); see also Mullins Coal Co. v.
Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 151 (1987).
51

52

See LaBelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1995).

R. SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 558 (1987)
("On any given date pneumoconiosis may not be detectable.... The disease, nevertheless, may
progress and later destroy sufficient lung tissue [to become detectable].")
53

54

THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY

(Robert Berkow & Andrew J. Fletcher,

eds., 16th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL] (explaining that progressive massive fibrosis, a form

of pneumoconiosis "may develop after exposure has ceased, or... progressive without further
exposure").
David V. Bates et al., A Longitudinal Study of Pulmonary Function in Coal Miners in
Lorraine, France, 8 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 21, 21 (1985) (observing continued, accelerated rates of
55

decline in lung function loss after retirement from mining in both smokers and nonsmokers).
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Pathology and Pathophysiology
In simple CWP, coal dust is widely deposited throughout
the lungs, leading to the development of "coal macules" around the
respiratory bronchioles. Later on mild dilation also occurs in the
same region. This dilation is known as focal emphysema;
however, it does not extend to the alveoli and is not associated with
airflow obstruction. Because coal is relatively nonfibrogenic,
distortion of lung architecture and functional impairment are
minimal. However, a few miners with categories 2 or 3 simple
CWP go on to develop progressive massive fibrosis (PMF). The
latter is defined as development of a large opacity > 1 cm on a
background of relatively advanced simple CWP. PMF may
develop after exposure has ceased and may progress without
further exposure, but not all subjects show progression. PMF
encroaches on and destroys the vascular bed and airways, as does
complicated silicosis, but this mass is amorphous and black. The
development of PMF appears to be unrelated to the silica content
of the coal; however, as in silicosis, anti-nuclear antibodies and
lung autoantibodies may be present in the serum of the affected
person.
Symptoms, Signs, and Diagnosis
CWP is not associated with any respiratory symptoms.
Cough and sputum occur as frequently in men without x-ray
evidence of this condition. When airways obstruction is present,
then it is either due to coincident pulmonary emphysema from
smoking, industrial bronchitis, or the presence of PMF, which is
the only disabling form of CWP. A few minor abnormalities of the
distribution of inspired gas are found in simple CWP, but these are
not associated with respiratory symptoms. The diagnosis depends
on a history of suitable exposure, usually at least 10 yr
underground, and the characteristic x-ray pattern of small rounded
opacities in both lung fields (simple CWP) or, in PMF a shadow >
1 cm in diameter occurring on a background of at least category 2
or 3 simple CWP.
Prophylaxis and Treatment
CWP can be prevented by increasing the efficiency of dust
suppression at the coal fact. The development of PMF usually can
be prevented by removing patients with x-ray changes typical
simple CWP from further coal dust exposure. There is no specific
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treatment; therapy is similar to that for nonspecific chronic
obstructive disease. 6
The court believed Congress had to have recognized the perniciously
progressive nature of the disease in enacting the BLBA based on statements
attributed to a 1985 law review article 7 rather than the statutory language or even
the legislative history. Relying in part on the Department of Labor ("DOL"), the
agency which administers the black lung programs, the court adopted the DOL's

litigation position that pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease and, that while the

symptoms may on occasion subside, the condition itself does not improveO8 Other
courts have shunned such an analysis and concluded that questions of science are
beyond the purview of appellate courts 9

The Third Circuit observed that courts have long acknowledged that
pneumoconiosis is a progressive and irreversible o disease. It found the contention
that "simple" pneumoconiosis, in contrast to its "complicated" form, is not a
The Third Circuit distinguished both the
progressive disease unpersuasive'
Supreme Court's Usery decision and the 1985 report of the Surgeon General. 2

56

MERCK MANUAL, supra note 54, at

672.

See Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The FederalBlack Lung Program- The
View From the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 575 (1985) ("Due to the insidious nature of the
progressive occupational respiratory disorders such as pneumoconiosis, Congress found that state
programs, which were aimed at adjudicating time-definite injuries, often precluded recovery due to the
running of statutes of limitations."). This statement refers to limitations on filing for state workers'
compensation benefits not the latent nature of coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
57

LaBelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1995; see also 62 Fed.
Reg. 3338, 3342-44 (Jan. 22, 1997) for Department of Labor's position.

58

59

See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Hillard, 65 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).

60

See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director. OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 151 (1997); Kowalchick v.

Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1990); accordBack v. Director, OWCP, 796 F.2d 169,
172 (6th Cir. 1986); Orange v. Island Creek Coal Co., 786 F.2d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 1986);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Chubb, 741 F.2d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 1984); Andryka v. Rochester &
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 14 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-34 (B.R.B. 1990); Stanley v. Betty B. Coal Co., 13
Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-72 (B.R.B. 1990); Belcher v. Beth-Elkhom Corp., 6 Black Lung Rep. (MB)
1-1180 (B.R.B. 1984).
61

Swarrow, 72 F.3d at 315.

62

UNrrD STATES SURGEON GENERAL, THEHEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, CANCER AND

CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE INTHE WORKPLACE (1985).
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In the proposed regulatory changes, the DOL seeks to codify the holding of
Third
Circuit in LaBelle.63 The definition of pneumoconiosis is proposed to be
the
may
altered to recognize pneumoconiosis as a "latent and progressive disease which
6
first become detectable only after the cessation of coal mine dust exposure.
Encouraged by the judicial change in the definition of pneumoconiosis by
the Fourth (obstructive) and Third (latent) Circuits on less than compelling
scientific grounds, the DOL seeks to change the definition of the disease for all
black lung claims in all circuits. The nature of pneumoconiosis should not be
defined by regulatory fiat 65 or by ajudicial review of a de minimus selection of the
medical literature. The Black Lung Benefits Program has been plagued by repeated
attempts to ease the litigation of these complex claims by adopting easy rules for
resolving conflicting evidence as imposed by the Benefits Review Board66 or
various appellate courts.67 In black lung cases, mechanical rules frequently do not
work and lead to bizarre results. LaBelle and Warth add another chapter to the
attempt to over simplify the adjudication of these claims.
III. THE TREATING PHYSICIAN: THE BEST
DETERMINER OF PNEUMOCONIOSIS?

These proposed changes to the regulations are not limited to changing the
definition of pneumoconiosis. The changes suggest the role of the treating
physician should be moved to the forefront in the litigation of these claims. With

63

See 62 Fed. Reg. at 3378.

64

Id.

65

The proposed regulations rely on several medical studies to support the contention that

pneumoconiosis is latent and progressive. 62 Fed. Reg. at 3344. Interestingly, these articles come
from the study of French coal miners despite the large scale and long term studies of American coal
miners that go unaddressed. The proposals are neither an exhaustive analysis of the medical literature
nor are proposed by a medical committee or physician trained to offer expert opinion on this issue.
66

For example, the true-doubt rule, used to resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the benefits

claimant was eventually discarded as improper. See Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S.

267 (1994).
The short cut method of relying on any positive evidence to shift the burden of proof was
rejected. See Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom Mullins Coal Co., Inc. of Virginia v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987).
67
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certain caveats, the "treating physician," a term that is conspicuously left undefined,
is to be given "controlling weight."6
The role of the treating physician has served as an area of discord in black
lung claims. For example, the Sixth Circuit adopted a long standing rule in social
security cases acknowledging deference to the benefits claimant's treating
physician.6 9 The basis for the Tussey decision is dubious.7" Other circuits have
68

The proposed regulations would provide,

(d) Treating physician. The medical opinion of a miner's treating physician may
be entitled to controlling weight in determining whether the miner is, or was,
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis or died due to pneumoconiosis. The
adjudication officer shall take into consideration the following factors in weighing
the opinion of a treating physician:
(1) Nature of relationship. The opinion of a physician who
has treated the miner for respiratory of pulmonary conditions
is entitled to more weight than a physician who has treated
the miner for non-respiratory conditions;
(2) Duration of relationship. The length of the treatment
relationship demonstrates whether the physician has observed
the miner long enough to maintain a superior understanding
of his or her condition;
(3) Frequency of treatment. The frequency of physicianpatient visits demonstrates whether the physician has
observed the miner often enough to obtain a superior
understanding of his or her condition; and
(4) Extend of treatment.
The types of testing and
examinations conducted during the treatment relationship
demonstrate whether the physician has obtained superior and
relevant information concerning the miner's condition.
(5) Whether controlling weight is given to the opinion of a
miner's treating physician shall also be based on the
credibility of the physician's opinion in light of its reasoning
and documentation, other relevant evidence and the record as
a whole.
62 Fed. Reg. at 3375.
69

See Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1993).

70

Tussey relies on two cases, Sexton v. Director, OWCP, 752 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1985), and

Colins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1984), to support the
asserted rule of law that it is "clearly established that a treating physician's opinion is entitled to greater
weight than those of non-treating physicians." Tussey, 982 F.2d at 1042. Neither of these cited cases
provides a basis for the precedent underlying the assertion of deference to treating physicians in
Tussey. Sexton provided an ALJ erred in giving greater weight to a non-examining doctor's negative
reading of a single x-ray than to the results of examinations and x-ray readings by two qualified
physicians. Sexton, 752 F.2d at 215-16. Collins held the finding of non-disability contained in the
report of a physician who has not examined a patient is insufficient evidence to rebut the positive proof
of disability established in this case. Collins, 734 F.2d at 1180. These cases do not stand for the

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1998

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:601

shunned such a blanket or mechanical deference to the treating physician based only
on the status of the physician-patient relationship!' The Fourth Circuit, over a
dissent, addressed the suggestion that it adopt a blanket or mechanical rule to credit
the treating physician:
We reject his contention. Neither this circuit nor the Benefits
Review Board has ever fashioned either a requirement or a
presumption that treating or examining physicians' opinions be
given greater weight than opinions of other expert physicians. We
have often stated that as a general matter the opinions of treating
and examining physicians deserve especial consideration. We
stated, for example, in Hubbard v. Califano, 582 F.2d 319,323 (4th
Cir. 1978), that "[we] place [ ] great reliance on a claimant's
treating physician," and, citing Hubbard, in King v. Califano, 615
F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir. 1980), that "[we] place [ ] great reliance
on the conclusions of a claimant's examining physician." In
neither case, however, did we suggest, much less hold, that the
opinions of treating or examining physicians must be accorded
greater weight than the opinions of other physicians. It is, of
course, one thing to say that we give great weight to the treating or
examining physician's opinion; it is quite another to say that as a
matter of law we give greater weight to such an opinion than to
opinions by other physicians.72
Requiring the ALJ, as the trier-of-fact, to analyze all of the relevant
evidence and to make a determination which competing physician's opinion as to
a disease or a disability assessment is the better reasoned, and the most just,
approach. There is no logical reason to assume the treating physician is always the
best judge of the presence of pneumoconiosis.
The Third Circuit recently reiterated its position that a treating physician's
opinion may be accorded greater weight than the opinions of other physicians of
record, but the ALJ may permissibly require the treating physician to provide more
than a conclusory statement before finding that pneumoconiosis contributed to the

proposition that clearly a treating physician's opinion is entitled to greater weight.
71

See, e.g., Peabody Coal v. Helms, 901 F.2d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1990).

72

Grizzle v. Pickands Mather and Co./Chisolms Mines, 994 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (4th Cir.

1993) (footnotes omitted) (omissions in original).
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miner's death.7 a In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit adopted a holding
from the Eighth Circuit!4 The treating physician's statement on a death certificate
that refers to pneumoconiosis could not be viewed as a reasoned medical finding,
particularly if no autopsy had been performed.75
The proposed change by the DOL runs afoul of the majority of established
circuit court guidance for the analysis of conflicting opinions under the BLBA. In
fact, the treating physician rule attempts to create a presumption, virtually
irrebuttable, to accord extra weight to the opinion of the treating physician, which
steals the discretion from the fact finder in rendering a decision based on an analysis
of all the evidence of record.76
IV. ESTABLISHING PNEUMOCONIOSIS UNDER PART 718
As most claims currently being adjudicated were filed after 1982, they are
controlled by the criteria presented at 20 C.F.R. Part 718. In 1997, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the position presented by
the Director that to establish pneumoconiosis, all of the relevant evidence as to its
existence should be considered together rather than separately.77 Consideration of
all relevant evidence is a fundamental tenet of the BLBA.7"
In Penn Allegheny, the Third Circuit agreed with the position presented by
the Director that although Section 718.202(a)(1) through (4) enumerates four
distinct methods of establishing pneumoconiosis, all types of relevant evidence
must be weighed together to determine whether the claimant suffers from the
disease.79 The court found significant the language of the regulation that does not

73

See Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1997).

74

Risher v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 940 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1991).

75

Id.

76

Both the BLBA and the Administrative Procedure Act require that all relevant evidence be

considered in rendering decisions. See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1994);
Underwood v. Elkay Mining Co., 105 F.3d 946 (4th Cir. 1997).
77

See Penn Allegheny Coal Co. v. Williams, 114 F.3d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1997).

78

See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1994); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987).

79

Section 718.202(a)(1) through (4) provides, in pertinent part,
(a) A finding of the existence of pneumoconiosis may be made as follows:
(1) A chest x-ray conducted and classified in accordance with
718.102 may form the basis for a finding of the existence of
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list the four methods in the disjunctive. The word "or" did not appear between the
paragraphs enumerating the four approved methods of determining the presence of
pneumoconiosis. The Benefits Review Board erred by affirming the finding of the
presence of pneumoconiosis based on analysis of x-ray evidence without an
evaluation of the other relevant evidence. In this case, biopsy evidence was
available that did not show evidence of pneumoconiosis. The BLBA 0 requires that
all relevant evidence must be evaluated to determine the existence of
pneumoconiosis.
An unanswered issue in weighing conflicting evidence as to the existence
of pneumoconiosis stems from the interpretation of Section 718.202(a) (1)
through(a)(4) by the Third Circuit in Penn Allegheny and the distinction between
the "legal" and "medical" pneumoconiosis. If a physician relies, in whole or in part,
on a chest x-ray believed to be positive for pneumoconiosis to diagnose
pneumoconiosis, then the x-ray evidence is ruled not to establish the existence of
pneumoconiosis, is the physician's opinion relevant to a determination of
pneumoconiosis under Section 718.202(a)(4)? While the Fourth Circuit has
specifically addressed the contrary situation - where physicians believe x-rays do
not reveal evidence of pneumoconiosis and the preponderance of the x-ray evidence
is found to show the existence of pneumoconiosis 8 - courts have yet to determine
what, if any, weight should be accorded to a physician's assessments under Section
718.202(a)(4) premised on the incorrect notion that x-rays revealed
pneumoconiosis.

pneumoconiosis;
(2) A biopsy or autopsy conducted and reported in
compliance with § 718.103 may be the basis for a finding of
the existence of pneumoconiosis;
(3) If the presumptions described in §§ 718.304, 718.305 or
§ 718.306 are applicable, it shall be presumed that the miner

is or was suffering from pneumoconiosis;
(4) A determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis may
also be made if a physician, exercising sound medical
judgment, notwithstanding a negative x-ray, finds that the
miner suffers or suffered from pneumoconiosis as defined in
§ 718.201.
20 C.F.R. § 718.202. See also Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1990).
80

30 U.S.C. § 923 (1994).

81

See Grigg v. Director, OWCP, 28 F.3d 416, 418-19 (4th Cir. 1994); Hobbs v. Clinchfield

Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819, 820 (4th Cir. 1995); Dehue Coal Co. v. Ballard, 65 F.3d 1189, 1195 (4th Cir.
1995).
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V. WHAT TO CONSIDER - IS EVIDENCE CUMULATIVE?

Courts 82 and commentators 83 have fretted over the amount of evidence
proffered in the litigation of Black Lung Claims, usually objecting to the amount of
evidence coal mine operators have developed in defense of these claims. One
appellate Judge observed,
The current norm is the contest of physician's reports. If this
exercise ever had a fresh, truth-seeking outlook, it has long since
faded. Tell me where the miner lives and the name of the
respondent employer, and I can make a pretty accurate guess as to
who the various experts are and what their reports say. Though the
employer's resources usually translate into more experts, I am not
singling out one side for the blame. Disability, or the lack thereof,
seems inevitably in the eye of the paid beholder.8 4
The DOL has proposed to radically alter the adjudicatory procedures in
Black Lung Claims by arbitrarily limiting the amount of evidence the parties can
offer in a claim. 5 The DOL proposes to fundamentally restructure the claims
adjudication process by limiting evidentiary development. The parties would only
be allowed to offer evidence while claims are pending before the District Director
and are limited in the types and amounts of evidence that can be offered. These
proposed changes have been criticized by both claimants and coal mine operators
as needlessly restrictive.
Such proposed limitations would run afoul of the principles upon which the
BLBA functions.8 6 Hearings conducted under the BLBA are also governed by

82

See Woodward v. Director, OWCP, 991 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1993); Grizzle v. Pickands

Mather and Co./Chisolm Mines, 994 F.2d 1093, 1101 (4th Cir. 1993).
83

Cogan, supranote 18, at 1004 n.3.

84

Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1101.

85

See 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (Jan. 22, 1997).

86

See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1994) (requiring consideration of all relevant evidence).
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provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act which requires consideration of
relevant evidence.87
The applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
governing the admission of evidence provides, "Any oral or documentary evidence
may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion
of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence." 8' The Fourth Circuit
offered the following black letter rule for an ALJ to determine if evidence should
be considered:
[I]n considering multiple opinions of medical experts in black lung
benefits cases, ALJ's should recognize that they must consider all
relevant evidence, erring on the side of inclusion, but that they
should exclude evidence that becomes unduly repetitious in the
sense that the evidence provides little or no additional probative
value. 9
There is little room to argue what the rule should be: when in doubt,the ALJ should
let evidence into the administrative record to be considered. Unless the provisions
of the APA are changed by Congress, all relevant evidence shall be considered.
There seems to be little controversy left regarding "cumulative evidence."

87

See id § 925(a) (incorporating 33 U.S.C. §919(d), in turn incorporating 5 U.S.C. §554 (the

Administrative Procedure Act)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(a) (1997); Bethlehem Mines Corp. v.
Henderson, 939 F.2d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1991).
88

5 U.S.C. § 556 (1994).

89

Underwood v. Elkay Mine, Inc., 105 F.3d 946 (4th Cir. 1997).
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VI. MATERIAL CHANGE IN CONDITION AND DUPLICATE CLAIMS

Two provisions of the regulations escaped much attention before the mid1980s. Section 725.30990 addresses duplicate claims and Section 725.31091
addresses requests for reconsideration made within one year of a denial of benefits.
Interest in the application of these regulations exploded with the 1988 decision of
the Benefits Review Board that ruled a claimant is not entitled to a full hearing on
the claim of a material change in conditions. 2 Several years later the Tenth Circuit

90

20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c) - (d) provides:

(c) A claimant who filed a claim for benefits under part B of title IV of the Act or
part C of title IV of the Act before March 1, 1978, and whose previous claim(s)
are pending or have been finally denied, who files an additional claim under this
part, shall have the later claim merged with any earlier claim subject to review
under part 727 of this subchapter. If an earlier claim subject to review under part
727 of this subchapter has been denied after review, a new claim filed under this
part shall also be denied, on the grounds of the prior denial, unless the deputy
commissioner determines that there has been a material change in conditions or
the later claim is a request for modification and the requires of § 725.310 are met.
If an earlier survivor's claim subject to review under part 727 of this subchapter
has been denied, the new claim filed under this part shall also be denied unless the
deputy commissioner determines that the later claim is a request for modification
and the requirements of § 725.310 are met;
(d) In the case of a claimant who files more than one claim for benefits under this
part, the later claim shall be merged with the earlier claim for all purposes if the
earlier claim is still pending. If the earlier miner's claim has been finally denied,
the later claim shall also be denied, on the grounds of the prior denial, unless the
deputy commissioner determines that there has been a material change in
conditions or the later claim is a request for modification and the requirements of
§725.310 are met. If an earlier survivor's claim filed under this part has been
finally denied, the new claim filed under this part shall also be denied unless the
deputy commissioner determines that the later claim is a request for modification
and the requirements of § 725.310 are met.
20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c) - (d) (1997).
91

20 C.F.R. § 725.310(a) provides:

(a) Upon his or her own initiative, or upon the request of any party on grounds of
a change in conditions or because of a mistake in determination of fact, the deputy
commissioner may, at any time before one year from the date of the last payment
of benefits, or at any time before one year after the denial of a claim, reconsider
the terms of an award or denial of benefits.
20 C.F.R. § 7.25.310(1) (1997).
92

Lukman v. Director, OWCP, 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-71 (B.R.B. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d
1248 (10th Cir. 1990). See Rita A. Massie, Modification of Benefits for Claimants Under the Federal
Black Lung Benefits Program,97 W. VA. L. REV. 1023 (1995).
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reversed the decision93 and held that a miner is entitled to a full administrative

hearing on a duplicate claim. The circuit courts that routinely consider Black Lung
Claims have each in turn addressed the standard to apply in considering a claim
under the duplicate claim provision and whether a material change in condition has
been established.94
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Director's interpretation of the regulations
and held that proof of one element of entitlement 95 is sufficient to show a change
in conditions and require the ALJ to weigh all of the relevant evidence to determine
if benefits should be awarded on modification.96 A second method has been
suggested by the Seventh Circuit 7 Here, the benefits claimant is held to a

somewhat more rigorous standard of proof, which requires a showing that there has
been a substantial change in health than that which existed at the time of the prior
denial. However, even a slight worsening could be a material change in condition."
A material change of conditions is "that evidence which is relevant and probative
so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the prior administrative
result."99
In 1997, the Eighth Circuit addressed the material change in condition
standard to be applied to subsequent claims under the duplicate claim provision of

93

See Lukman, 896 F.2d 1254.

See Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 1994); Lisa Lee Mines v. Director,
OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Sahara Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 946 F.2d 554
(7th Cir. 1991).

94

In a Part 718 claim, the benefits claimant needs to prove four distinct elements: (I) the
existence of pneumoconiosis; (2) that pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; (3) that
there is a pulmonary impairment that would prevent the miner from performing their exertional rigors
associated with the last regular coal mine work; and (4) that the pulmonary impairment is due, at least
in part, to pneumoconiosis. See Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35, 36, 38 (4th Cir.
1990).
96

The Third and Fourth Circuits have adopted this same approach. See LaBelle Processing Co.

v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995); Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir.
1996).
97

See Sahara Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 946 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1991).

98

Id.

99

SaharaCoal Co., 946 F.2d at 556.
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Section 725.309." Pneumoconiosis was held to be a progressive and irreversible
disease in that it may develop in a miner after he has ceased working in the mines.
The Eighth Circuit applied the one element standard previously adopted by the
Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.1"' Specifically, the ALJ must consider whether
the weight of the new evidence of record submitted by all the parties establishes at
least one of the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against the miner.
The one element must be capable of change, for example the existence of
pneumoconiosis or total disability. The court adopted the Director's explanation
that if a miner was found not to have pneumoconiosis at the time of the earlier
denial, and the miner thereafter establishes that he has the disease, in the absence
of evidence showing the denial was a mistake, an inference of a material change is
not only permitted, but compelled.
The Tenth Circuit has taken yet a third approach. 3 Using the language of
the regulation, the court held, "[]n order to bring a duplicate claim, a claimant must
prove for each element that actually was decided adversely to the claimant in the
prior denial that there has been a material change in that condition since the prior
claim was denied." 1°4
The Tenth Circuit observed that all of these approaches look to an element
test; that is, if the claim was denied for the failure to prove one element (i.e., the
existence of pneumoconiosis) and the miner is able to produce evidence on this
element, there may be a new adjudication of the claim with no deference given to
the previous decisions.
These duplicate claims provisions apply only to miner's claims. A
survivor's claim that has been denied is not able to be re-litigated under the
duplicate claim provision if there has not been a claim of a material change in
condition or an allegation of a mistake in the determination of fact made within one

100

See Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1385

(1998).
101

See Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d 1358; Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 1996);

Sahara Coal Co., 946 F.2d 554.
102

See Lovilia Coal, 109 F.3d at 453.

103

See Wyoming Fuel Co. v. Director, OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502, 1509 (10th Cir. 1966).

104

Id.atl511.
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year of the denial of the claim."0 5 Like a miner, the survivor can move for
modification under Section 728.310, apparently, for an unlimited number of times.
While the principles of finality do not generally apply to black lung
claims,"° the re-litigation of the same issues by the same parties may be precluded
The
even under the duplicate claim or reconsideration provisions.'0 7
reconsideration provisions provide a Congressionally-granted exception to claim
preclusion." 8 These provisions, entitled modification, allow either party to relitigate a claim on one of two grounds: a mistake in determination of fact or a
material change in conditions."° While arguments might be effectively made as to
the need for such an exception to claim preclusion as coal workers' pneumoconiosis
can progress in some individuals, the exception is not so clear in all cases. When a
benefits claimant is disabled and has simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis, but fails
to be able to prove pneumoconiosis has caused the pulmonary disability, there is no
need for repeated hearings. In these situations, the need for finality for both the
benefits claimant and the coal mine operator is justified if, for no other reason, than
to halt the seemingly endless attempts to secure benefits. Finality provides certainty
for the parties that the procedures have finally ended, allowing the applicant, the
operator, and its insurer to close the claim and move on.
The Supreme Court addressed the applicability of modification in a recent
case arising under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 1 ' The
Court explained,
On the initial claim for nominal compensation under the Act, then,
the employee has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that he has been injured and that the odds are significant
that his wage-earning capacity will fall below his pre-injury wages
at some point in the future. But when an employer seeks
modification of previously awarded compensation, the employer
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20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c) - (d) (1997); see also Clark v. Director OWCP, 9 Black Lung Rep.

(MB) 1-205 (B.R.B. 1986) (per curiam), rev'd on othergrounds, 838 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1988).
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See generally Jessee v. Director, OWCP, 5 F.3d 723, 725 (4th Cir. 1993).
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See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 122-23 (1988).
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is the proponent of the order with the burden of establishing a
change in conditions justifying modification. In a case like this,
where the prior award was based on a finding of economic harm
resulting from an actual decline in wage-earning capacity at the
time the award was entered, the employer satisfies this burden by
showing that as a result of a change in capacity the employee's
wages have risen to a level at or above his pre-injury earnings.
Once the employer makes this showing, § 8(h) [33 U.S.C. §
308(h)] gives rise to the presumption that the employee's wageearning capacity is equal to his current, higher wage and, in the
face of this presumption, the burden shifts back to the claimant to
show that the likelihood of a future decline in capacity is sufficient
for an award of nominal compensation."'
The impact of the Court's Rambo decision has yet to impact federal black lung
claims. Whether the presumption of a progressive and latent nature of
pneumoconiosis is pr6per or which party shoulders the burden of proof for the
analysis are still debatable and seem to vary among the federal circuits.
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed a three judge panel's decision
that would have drastically altered the standard utilized in evaluating duplicate
claims." 2 In an unusual turn of events, Circuit Judge Wood wrote both the panel's
opinion in Spece land the majority opinion in Spece I. In Spece I, the Court ruled
that the duplicate claim should have been interpreted to have merged with a prior
denied claim and, for purposes of adjudicating the duplicate claim, it should be
merged with the first claim taking on the properties, including, the eligibility for
review under 20 C.F.R. Part 727 instead of Part 718.'1 This interpretation of the
regulations conflicted with another circuit's decision" 4 and risked adding $1.08
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Rambo, 117 S. Ct. at 1963-64.
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See Peabody Coal v. Spece, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (Spece fl) rev'g

Peabody Coal Co. v. Spece 94 F.3d 369 (7th Cir. 1996) (Spece 1).
Spece 1, 94 F.3d at 372. The difference between Part 727 and Part 718 is significant. When
a miner presents evidence of pneumoconiosis or a pulmonary disability, the presumption of total
disability due to pneumoconiosis arises, and the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to rebut
the elements of entitlement. Under Part 718 no such presumption is afforded a miner as to
pneumoconiosis, total disability or disability due to pneumoconiosis.
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billion in liability to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund."' Additional risk would
be borne by coal mine operators and their insurers beyond the one billion dollars in
potential benefits that would be imposed on the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
In Spece II, the en banc panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the Spece I
determination and held that where a material change of condition is established,
there is no merger with any earlier denied claims for purposes of determining the
onset of benefits unless the earlier claim is pending or finally denied before March
1, 1978. While sitting en banc,the Seventh Circuit addressed a perceived confusion
among its sister circuits about the scope of the decision in Sahara Coal Co., Inc.
v. 0. W.C.P."6 regarding what is required to show a material change in conditions
for purposes of a second or subsequent application.
The Seventh Circuit explained there existed
no quarrel with the general proposition or the applicability to new
claims brought under the black lung benefits program. The key
point is that the claimant cannot simply bring in new evidence that
addresses his condition at the time of the earlier denial. His theory
of recovery on the new claim must be consistent with the
assumption that the original denial was correct." 7
The court adopted the Director's interpretation that
[a]t least one element might independently have supported a
decision against the claimant has now been shown to be different
(implying that the earlier denial was correct), then we would agree
that the 'one-element' test is the correct one. [However,] if the
Director means something more expansive, his position would go
beyond the principals of res judicata that are reflected in Section
725.309(c) and that we endorsed in Sahara Coal."'
The court deferred from addressing whether pneumoconiosis progresses.
Rather, it explained the question of whether simple pneumoconiosis can progress
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in the absence of further exposure to coal dust is a question of legislative fact." 9
While progression of pneumoconiosis is not the sort of thing that should vary from
case to case, there will always be a question of whether a particular miner in fact
contracted the disease and became totally disabled by it. Rather than try to resolve
the scientific issue, the court agreed that Peabody had failed to both make a proper
record in this case and exhaust its remedies before the ALJ with this argument.
Without such a record, the court was left to judge Mr. Spece's evidence of a
delayed appearance of pneumoconiosis and the agency's acceptance of the general
theory of progressivity, which was enough to establish entitlement.

VII.

IDENTIFICATION OF RESPONSIBLE OPERATORS

Two recent cases' have addressed the responsibilities of the Director in
naming coal mine operators as being potentially responsible for payment of benefits
to miners under the BLBA."' The Third Circuit resolved to award benefits to
Armando Venicassa, a retired coal miner, because of errors in the naming of the
responsible operator."n Venicassa had been initially awarded benefits by an ALJ
who designated the Office of Workers' Compensation Program ("OWCP") to pay
benefits to Venicassa through the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. United States
Steel Corporation, the entity that had been incorrectly named as responsible
operator," had been dismissed by the ALJ in a 1988 decision after a hearing. The
OWCP moved to remand the responsible operator and the claim prior to the hearing
to rename Venicassa's last coal mine employer (Consolidation Coal Company) as
responsible operator. However, this motion was denied. The ALJ denied the motion
believing due process dictated a hearing go forward and OWCP be substituted to
defend the claim when the operator named was not found to be the responsible
operator. He based this belief on a prior decision from the Benefits Review
119

Id. at 1010. (citing Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir.

1982)) (explaining that legislative facts are "general considerations that move a law making or rule

making body to adopt a rule").
See Venicassa v. Consolidation Coal Co., 137 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998); Lane Hollow Coal
Co. v. Director, OWCP, 137 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1998).
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See 20 C.F.R. § 725.412 (1997).
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See Venicassa, 137 F.3d 197.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.490-.493 (1997), which address the criteria for naming the responsible
123
operator. Generally, the responsible operator is the most recent employer of a benefits claimant that
employed the claimant as a coal miner for at least 125 working days over at least a 12 month period.
See id. §§ 725.492-.493.
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Board.'24 The Benefits Review Board vacated the award of benefits, remanded the
claim to OWCP, designated Consolidation Coal Company as a possible responsible
operator, and returned the claim to be re-adjudicated. Based on new evidence
presented in 1992, the ALJ denied benefits and found Venicassa could not establish
total disability due to pneumoconiosis. While the Benefits Review Board affirmed
the denial of benefits, a two judge majority of the Third Circuit concluded it was
error to remand the case for designation of a second responsible operator.
Despite possessing accurate information concerning Venicassa's
employment history since the filing of the claim, OWCP had failed to designate the
proper operator responsible to defend the claim. The failure to make a timely
designation of the proper responsible operator could not jeopardize the award of
benefits that was made. In reaching this conclusion, the majority pointed to the
language of the regulations that require identification of the responsible operator as
soon as after the filing of a claim as the evidence obtained permits."2 The Third
Circuit agreed with the logic in the BRB's Crabtree decision and concluded that
remand for reconsideration of the responsible operator issue would be tantamount
to re-litigating the claim, would cause piecemeal litigation, and obviously would not
be compatible with the efficient administration of the BLBA or the expeditious
processing of claims.' 2 6
OWCP sought to have the court disregard Crabtreeand follow the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Directorv. Oglebay Norton Company.127 The court easily
distinguished Venicassa's situation from Oglebay.2 1 Oglebay involved a dispute
between the OWCP and the named responsible operator; Venicassa's case involved
a dispute between the claimant, OWCP, and the putative responsible operator.
Oglebay had the ALJ remand the case for determination of another responsible
operator prior to a resolution of the claim on its merits; Venicassa's claim had an
ALJ issue on award of benefits. The Crabtreecase concerns about due process and
piecemeal litigation, relied on by the ALJ in denying the motion to remand filed by
OWCP, were judged greater in Venicassa's case than those which were faced by the
Sixth Circuit in Oglebay. The court also recognized another important distinction,
OWCP had before it all the relevant evidence necessary to designate the proper
responsible operator, but simply failed to do so. This penalized not only Venicassa,
124

See Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 Black Lung Rep. 1-354 (B.R.B. 1984).
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who had already litigated the case and won, but also the second responsible
operator, Consolidation Coal Company, which had to litigate a ten-year-old claim.'29
In Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP,"° the Fourth Circuit
addressed the process for the naming of the responsible operator. Mr. Lockhart,
the benefits claimant, filed his claim for benefits in 1975. His claim was reviewed
in 1980 and again in 1981. After the eligibility criteria were loosened by Congress
in 1977, the claim was forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law Judges for
a hearing. After five additional years had passed, OWCP moved to remand the
claim to name a responsible operator. The claim was remanded in 1986, and after
five more years passed, three responsible operators were named, but not his last coal
mine operator, Lane Hollow. After being referred to the Office of Administrative
Law Judges, a second motion to remand was filed and granted. This allowed Lane
Hollow to be finally notified of the claim in 1992, or seventeen years after notice
could have been given and eleven years after the regulations commanded that it be
given in accordance with the miner's request for a hearing.'
The extraordinary delay in notifying the responsible operator of potential
liability deprived Lane Hollow of a meaningful opportunity to defend itself, in
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Due process, aptly is
described as analogous to a big tent, covering not only procedural fundamentals, but
also substantive personal liberties and basic rules of justice.'32 The inexcusable
delay in notifying Lane Hollow deprived it of the opportunity to mount a
meaningful defense to the proposed depravation of its property, monetary benefits
that would be paid to Mr. Lockhart, and consequently Lane Hollow was denied due
process of law. As Lane Hollow could not be lawfully named the responsible
operator, payment of benefits to Mrs. Lockhart, on behalf of and as the survivor of
the deceased miner, must be made from the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
Both decisions are logical extensions of a 1995 Fourth Circuit decision.'
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit indicated it was OWCP's decision and burden to
identify, notify, and develop evidence regarding the responsible operators.'34 The
Lane Hollow and Venicassa decisions clearly advise OWCP that identification of
129
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the responsible operator shall be accomplished or else the Black Lung Disability
Trust Fund will be responsible for the claims.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Black Lung Program has never lived up to competing parties'
expectations. After the initial experiences in the early 1970s that saw huge approval
rates for claims, the program was legitimately viewed as a federal pension program.
After 1973, when the federal government passed the burden of paying for the
program to coal companies and their insurers, the program took on a whole new
flavor. Employers did not want to pay a federally-mandated pension program
cloaked as a disability program. Conflicts arose when the employers' expectations
collided with the established expectations of eligible benefits claimants. Claimants'
expectations were unrealistically inflated as the claims were not vigorously
defended by the government and were considered under presumptions (now not
applicable) that were beneficial to the benefits claimant. It became common for
claims to take years to resolve. While claims continue to take years to resolve, there
appears to be less tolerance among the parties and the courts for needless delays.
Black Lung claims are not easy to try. Those that litigate the claims are
challenged with conflicting precedent and byzantine regulations. As if that were not
enough, an understanding of pulmonary medicine becomes necessary. Yet, those
interested in these claims are afforded, via the internet, new resources that can
provide the understanding to represent parties in these claims. The Office of
Administrative Law Judges,'35 as well as Emory University,'3 6 maintain wonderful
web sites to afford the advocate the background to represent parties in these matters.
The black lung program has been subjected to quick-fix solutions that have
generally failed. It continues to be an example of how not to compensate
individuals afflicted with an occupationally-related disorder. The all-or-nothing
format that prohibits settlement of claims based on partial disability forces the
parties and physicians to take unrealistic positions to secure or defeat entitlement
for retired coal miners afflicted with a breathing disorder. The proposed changes
to the existing regulations fail to correct the existing problems and create a whole
new series of trap doors that, if adopted, will undoubtedly keep black lung cases on
the dockets of federal circuit courts in the coal mining regions in the United States
for years to come.
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